Aktuelles aus Prishtinë (Pristina), Mitrovica, Prizren, Prizeren, Pejë, Pec - Historisches zu Kosova und UCK
02:56
25.10.2020
Gjermanisht-anglisht Asim Mujkovic ist Assistenzprofessor an der Universität in Sarajevo. In einem längerem Artikel beschäftigt sich der bosnische Autor mit der Ethniesierung der Politik in seiner Heimat. Der Artikel belegt klar, zu welchen realen Verwerfungen es bezogen auf die Bürgerrechte und die sozialen und politischen Standards kommt, wenn jeder politische Diskurs von dem sogenannten -ethnischem Gesichtspunkt- aus geführt wird.

Bosnien ist bis heute dreigeteilt es gibt keine allgemeinen Bürger und Menschenrechte unabhängig von der Nationalität. Damit fällt Bosnien weit hinter die Postulate der Aufklärung zurück. Bosnien ist ethnisch geteilt, ökonomisch ohne jegliche Perspektive und von einer internationalen Verwaltung absolut regiert. Das Bosnische Szenario droht auch Kosova. Statt Selbstbestimmung, Souveränität und gleiche Rechte für all seine Bewohner, setzt die Staatengemeinschaft auf Teilung, und „multikulturelle Toleranz“. Letzteres entkernt das Selbstbestimmungsrecht, spaltet die Menschen und stellt das Land unter die Herrschaft von angeblich aufgeklärter Kolonialherren.


Dokumentation-Wir die Bürger von Ethnopolis


We, the Citizens of Ethnopolis
Asim Mujkic


Ten years ago the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, or Dayton Agreement, sponsored and supported by the United States, was signed on the premises of the Wright-Patterson military base in Dayton, Ohio.1 It was designed to bring an end to the tragic conflict in the region. Peace was indeed brought to Bosnia s ravaged homes. The senseless killing ceased. But in addition to the peaceenforcing aspect of the Dayton Agreement, it had another, and more long-term, aspect. This was to encourage the establishment of a functioning democracy and a viable civil society. So a Constitution was drafted as Annex 4 to the Dayton Agreement.2 It established institutions and offices, duties and responsibilities analogous to those of other democratic countries in the hope of facilitating Bosnia s transition to democracy, genuine civil society, and a free market economy. Unfortunately, ten years after the Dayton Agreement, these terms, drawn fromWestern liberal thought, do not describe the situation of Bosnia and Herzegovina: The Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina is a constitution of the Peace Agreement, not of a democratic country. It is an attempt to provide an internal framework to the administrative, territorial division of Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as to construct an institutional structure based on ethnic principles. Founded on ethnic representation, this constitution prefers by virtue of its inner logic political parties of the same, ethnic principle. These parties make a ruling coalition that has been unable to set up effective institutions; in fact, the lack of functioning of institutions is a natural way the government of these parties functions.3 Even a superficial look at Bosnian political practice forces one to conclude that the obvious lack of the main ingredients of constitutional liberalism in the vague provisions of its Constitution a document that elevates the collective rights of ethnic groups above those of individual citizens has pushed Bosnia s so-called democracy ever deeper into the quicksand of discriminatory, illiberal political and social practices. Indeed, the ethnic principle generally determines the constitutional procedures and functioning of the central government of the Dayton Constitution. 4 The unwillingness of the representatives of both the domestic and the international communities to introduce liberal principles has proved to be disastrous. The constitutional framework laid down in the Dayton Agreement encourages procedural democracy only among the political representatives or better, the ruling oligarchies of the various ethnic groups. The Constitution institutionalizes some new type of ethnic democracy that challenges the values of the European Enlightenment, of the individual as an abstract citizen. 5 So the Constitution has fostered what Amin Maalouf describes as a structure in which an individual s place in society is dependent on his belonging to some community or Constellations Volume 14, No 1, 2007. C The Author. Journal compilation C Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA.

We, the Citizens of Ethnopolis:


113 another, perpetuating a perverse state of affairs that can only deepen divisions. 6 Representation that depends exclusively on ethnic affiliation discourages civic initiative. According to J¨urgen Habermas, each and every person should receive a three-fold recognition: they should receive equal respect in their integrity as irreplaceable individuals, as members of ethnic or cultural groups, and as citizens, that is as members of the political community. 7 Although the Dayton Constitution provides a rather wide catalogue of basic human rights and freedoms,8 clearly stating that the rights and freedoms set forth in the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and its Protocols shall apply directly in Bosnia and Herzegovina. These shall have priority over all other law, 9 nevertheless there has never been an attempt to challenge the discriminatory articles of the Constitution that establish the priority of ethnic principles. The ruling, ethnically-based political parties have shown no willingness to do so because it would have undermined the very basis of their power, ethnic collective rights, while public discourse is heavily limited by what Seyla Benhabib calls a cordon sanitaire around the core commitments of cultural identities. 10 Thus, to return to Habermas s notion of citizen recognition, a citizen of Bosnia and Herzegovina is recognized only as a member of an ethnic group, and only through this recognition is he or she recognized as a member of political community. Under cover of the legitimacy conferred by free and fair elections, citizens as individuals are stripped of any political power.11 The exclusively ethnic form of political representation has negated the political citizen in the pluralism of his or her identities and political interests . . . . The Constitution recognizes only Bosniac, Croat, and Serb ethnic interests as legitimate political interests while all other aspects are excluded. 12 I suggest that the politics of Bosnia can be best described as a democracy of ethnic oligarchies rather than a democracy of citizens. This formally democratic procedure, which has no explicit constitutional provision for individual citizenship, has become a mechanism for the legitimation of political parties or, better put, movements that pretend to represent one of the three constituent peoples. The notion of constituent peoples is highly obscure, but it is one of the key terms of Bosnian ethnopolitics. From the historical and legal point of view, such an aspect of constituency is impossible to explain. Its background is definitively politically motivated. 13 The term constituent people is used to mean a nation, a particular national identity, and not to mean the people (populus) as the sum of individuals, citizens of a state. . . . This term is used in the case of multinational political communities or states without a clear majority. In conditions of a mixture of nations, the relation between a constituent people as a collective and an individual member of that collectivity is personal, and not territorial.14 In political practice it actually accentuates the predominance of group representation over individual rights. Such a legal basis imposes the permeation of national identity at all institutional levels and generates an overall ethnicization of the political system. 15 This term was first used in the Republic of Serbia s official submission to the C 2007 The Author. Journal compilation C 2007 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

We, the Citizens of Ethnopolis:

Asim Mujkic 119 3. It would be incorrect to conclude, however, that ethnopolitics has its own comprehensive doctrine, institutions, form of government, and principles. Ethnopolitics is, instead, parasitic on existing democratic institutions. For example, the protection of vital national interests is a phrase taken from the standard liberal-democratic vocabulary. Of course, in the Bosnian case it employs a rather vague sense of national. National is usually interpreted simply as ethnic. 42 The vocabulary of ethnopolitics borrows terms either from the vocabulary of the socialist institutions that have been destroyed or from the new liberal-democratic institutions that have been imposed by the international community. From the point of view of doctrine, ethnopolitics is a sort of melting-pot of various bits and pieces of political doctrines and principles: socialism, liberal democracy, fascism, romantic nationalism, religious nationalism. It also blends together various historical narratives, mythologies, literatures, religions, traditions, and memories of events that are considered of vital importance to the identity of a particular ethnic group and thus hypostasized as the discursive limits of the founding ethnic narrative. Unlike most other political practices, ethnopolitics is a non-doctrine; it has no goal, vision, or hope other than remaining in power. Neither the well-being of any particular ethnic group nor vital national-ethnic interests is the final goal of ethnopolitics. Its raison d Æetre is crisis, a constant appeal to the existential danger faced by the group. A permanent condition of threat is the only effective way for politicians to remain in power. If, by some miracle, all national issues were resolved overnight, the existence of three ethnopolitical parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina would seem pointless. Ethnopolitics, in this respect, is a necessarily transitory arrangement. It is, however, intended to last and to delay the formation of civil society as long as possible. This delay is observed in the political practice of prioritizing ethnic equality over ethical equality. Individuals, not groups, are the ultimate moral claimants in a democracy, but this is consistent with taking culture into account in considering the moral claims of individuals and groups that speak on their behalf. 43 Prioritizing groups is, however, not consistent with respect for individuals. This political practice is always, at the end of the day, authoritarian and oppressive. The right to national equality is indeed very important in multinational countries such as Bosnia and Herzegovina. It originates from human rights and it is not opposed to civil society. It is worth remembering that a nation as a historical category, a product of civil society. Only with the full freedom of the citizen and the realization of her or his individual identity is it possible to expect the realization of a national identity.44 4. Due to her or his marginalized and discriminated-against position under the Constitution, a Bosnian citizen is valuable only as a member of an ethnic group. He or she, according to ethnopolitical expectations, has two purposes in his or her individual life: a reproductive purpose (to increase the biological mass of the collective) and a pseudopolitical purpose (to vote for his or her kin in elections). Both of these functions or purposes are deeply biological. In the first case, this is obvious. The second presupposes that a vote for the representative of a person s kinship group is a precondition both for the existence of the group and for that of the individual. In other words, you don t vote C 2007 The Author. Journal compilation C 2007 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

Constellations Volume 14, Number 1, 2007 seriousness with the best of their knowledge, thus releasing their political representatives from any responsibility. 52 7. Ethnopolitical leaders advocate the development of a free market economy. However, the consequences of their economic endeavors reveal that they cherish economic autarchy. They want to ensure that each small, ethnically-based portion of the market is controlled by corrupt entrepreneurs, the nouveaux riches. This group is made up of corrupt political leaders, war profiteers, smugglers, and other criminals, most of them members of, or close to, the inner circles of ethnic parties. Ethnopolitics is in this regard para-economical. It concerns itself with reappropriation of public property (which, under Communism, was owned by society at large). It would be reasonable to describe Bosnian capitalism as capitalism ofWildWest (orWild East European, to be more accurate) type. The nouveaux riches connections to the ruling parties give them access to state capital and allow them to make use of it under extremely favorable conditions. The vital national interest of ethnic oligarchies is to maintain such conditions as long as possible. In order to do so, the corrupt and criminal nationalist political elites homogenize their peoples in a coordinated manner by various repressive, psychological, and propagandist methods, presenting themselves as naturally predetermined missionaries with the historical task of protecting national interests of their peoples. 53 8. Ethnopolitics is also pseudoscientific. One of the imperatives of the academic portions of the ethnic elites consists of what Ugo Vlaisavljevic calls the reappropriation of cultural ownership : Thus revised nationalism is based on a remake of a typically Communist ideology, exchanging collective ownership of the means of production for collective ownership of culture. The industrial revolution and agrarian reforms are to be followed by the reappropriation of the cultural heritage. 54 This task of reappropriation is entrusted to the humanities faculty, the departments of History, Literature, Philosophy, National Language, and the like, but also to certain of the social sciences, such as Political Science. Professors of the humanities in Bosnia have put themselves forward as formulators and interpreters of ethnic narratives. They viewthemselves as undertaking a sort of archaeology, digging out the authentic elements of a community or collective. Their findings and narratives are mainly of a mythical and religious nature. These narratives serve to promote the construction of ethnic ideologies. Various academic disciplines take it as their task to explain the content of a certain kinship or collective identity, thus giving scientific legitimacy to ethnopolitics. This practice is not new; the task of scientific legitimation of the ruling socialist ideology under Communism was turned over to the social sciences. Ethnic or national literature is also a focus for cultural reappropriation. However, the production of national being in its authenticity and pureness is best observed in the phenomenon of ethnically-segregated primary and secondary education. Based on the appeal to the right to education as enumerated in Article II, paragraph 3 of the Constitution as well as paragraph 4 on non-discrimination,55 the ethnopolitical parties imposed control over so-called national-group school curricula (national language, literature, history, geography, religion). As usual, the ethnopolitical appeals C 2007 The Author. Journal compilation C 2007 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

We, the Citizens of Ethnopolis:


Asim Mujkic

to universal human rights and respect for different cultures in all spheres of social life are implemented in the most particularistic and segregationist way. In the field, this means that the majority constituent people s political representatives impose their national curriculum in primary and secondary schools. In regions without a dominant constituent majority (cantons of Central Bosnia and Herzegovina-Neretva), the problem of national curriculum is solved in very primitive way: There are schools in Bosnia and Herzegovina where children of same age sit in different classrooms (most often on different floors of the school building) and learn according to different, completely opposed curricula. 56 The problem of cultural difference is therefore solved by the physical separation of children according to their ethnic background. Children of different ethnic background attend school in different shifts, sit in different classrooms on different floors, if possible, under the same roof, and learn mostly quite different things. This segregation in education is a true product of Dayton-style democracy. 57 Jago Musa, Minister of Education of Herzegovina-Neretva and implementer of segregationist educational policy, recently said attempting to defend this ethnic approach: There is no segregation in our schools. For segregation we need blacks. This racist statement sadly reveals that political leaders of main ethnopolitical parties do not see any problem in segregated schools. It further reveals that education is merely the means to the realization of certain nationalist party politics, and as such, has no internal, autonomous value, neither humanistic nor social, and in such a context segregation is not a phenomenon deserving a serious attention (since scandalous relativist and racist allusions are permitted). 58 Segregationist practice provokes rage and revolt from time to time, mostly among ordinary citizens,59 but not, unfortunately, among those responsible for this miserable situation, ethnopolitical representatives. Besides obvious occasional conflicts and the escalation of ethnic intolerance generated by this system, these representatives generally viewit as unproblematic. They are political representatives of constituent peoples, not of citizens. The final goal of education system they sponsor is not the rearing of a future citizen of democracy, but a good member of constituent people a good Bosniac, Serb, or Croat. Education in Bosnia and Herzegovina is not civic but ethnic, and, in an ironic sense, multiethnic, such that children of two different ethnic backgrounds sit in separate classrooms under the same roof. In this way, ethnopolitics is reproduced by breeding new generations of future xenophobes. Education in Bosnia and Herzegovina is our crucial failure. In the long run we are rearing the new children of future nationalisms. I cannot believe that there is no civic outrage about this. We are living in educational apartheid and we have become used to it. Education is the key evidence that the international community, together with local political entrepreneurs, are producing a virtual Bosnia and Herzegovina and a real Rhodesia. The people who produce ethnical segregation among children deserve nothing but absolute contempt. However, this kind of education is a mere reflection of this country s construction. Should such a construction prevail in near future we will continue to have children whowould be incapable of any agreement and consensus.60 C 2007 The Author. Journal compilation C 2007 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

We, the Citizens of Ethnopolis: Asim Mujkic 125 The goal of these three nationalistic philosophies is not to initiate some kind of physical conflict. Their goal is to maintain a certain level of frustration among ordinary citizens and thereby to maintain a logic of exclusiveness and distrust toward the other ethnic groups and in such a way as to extend their rule.62 This systematic indoctrination conducted by ethnopolitics leads directly to a dangerous depoliticization of individual members of ethnic groups. They leave political reasoning to their elected leaders, the watchdogs of their survival. Even a superficial view of Bosnian public affairs reveals that no scandal, corruption, or failure of the ruling structures can create public rage, much less an appropriate public reaction. The Bosnian peoples and citizens have undergone political euthanasia. That is the final product of ethnopolitics. In the end I can only agree with Friedland when he points out that religious nationalism makes politics religious obligation and requires withdrawal from modernity; it has no economical element, no goal other than itself. 63 Ethnopolitics has no such goal either; it is utterly autistic. NOTES I am thankful to Professor Richard Rorty for helping me coin the term of the title. 1. The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina was negotiated in Dayton, Ohio on November 21, 1995 under tremendous pressure from the Clinton administration. The Agreement was officially signed in Paris on December 14, 1995 by its parties: delegations of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia, and the Federal Republic ofYugoslavia, witnessed by the EU special negotiator and representatives of France, Germany, Russia, the UK, and the US. 2. The Dayton Agreement is in fact a two-page document with 11 Articles, to which 11 Annexes are attached. 3. Zarko Papic, Novi Dayton nikome ne treba, Dani (Sarajevo), Nov. 18, 2005, 34. 4. Edin Sarcevic, Ustavi i politika (Srajevo: VKBI, 1997), 53. 5. Ibid., 55. 6. Amin Maalouf, In the Name of Identity: Violence and the Need to Belong (New York: Penguin: 2003), 149. 7. J¨urgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996), 496. 8. Article II, Paragraph 3: All persons within the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina shall enjoy human rights and fundamental freedoms referred to in paragraphs 2 above; these include: (a) The right to life. (b) The right not to be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. (c) The right not to be held in slavery or servitude or to perform forced or compulsory labor. (d) The rights to liberty and security of person. (e) The right to a fair hearing in civil and criminal matters, and other rights relating to criminal proceedings. (f) The right to private and family life, home, and correspondence. (g) Freedom of thought, conscience, and religion. (h) Freedom of expression. (i) Freedom of peaceful assembly and freedom of association with others. (j) The right to marry and to found a family. (k) The right to property. (l) The right to education. (m) The right to liberty of movement and residence. 9. Article II, Paragraph 2. 10. Seyla Benhabib, On Culture, Public Reason, and Deliberation: Response to Pensky and Peritz, Constellations 11, no. 2 (2004): 296. 11. Here are only a fewstriking examples of ethnic-principle domination from the Constitution: The Preamble of Bosnian Constitution singles out Bosniacs, Croats, and Serbs as constituent peoples

Constellations Volume 14, Number 1, 2007 while bracketing the Others (See Annex 4 of the General Framework). Though there is a mention of citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina, it is not clear how these citizens are to possess either rights and powers except as declared members of constituent peoples (or at least members of the Others : Jews, Ukrainians, Czechs, Albanians, Roma, etc.). Article IV, 3 (b) provides that: Each chamber shall by majority vote adopt its internal rules and select from its members one Serb, one Bosniac, and one Croat to serve as its Chair and Deputy Chairs, with the position of Chair rotating among the three persons selected. Furthermore, paragraph (e) provides that: A proposed decision of the Parliamentary Assembly may be declared to be destructive of a vital interest of the Bosniac, Croat, or Serb Delegates. . . . Such a proposed decision shall require for approval in the House of Peoples a majority of the Bosniac, of the Croat, and of the Serb Delegates present at voting. Paragraph (f): When a majority of the Bosniac, of the Croat, or of the Serb Delegates objects to the invocation of paragraph (e), the Chair of the House of Peoples shall immediately convene a Joint Commission comprising three Delegates, one each selected by the Bosniac, by the Croat, and by the Serb Delegates, to resolve the issue. Paragraph (g): The House of Peoples may be dissolved by the Presidency or by the House itself, provided that the House s decision to dissolve is approved by a majority that includes the majority of Delegates from at least two of the Bosniac, Croat, or Serb peoples. 12. Jasna Baksic-Muftic, Ljudska prava u ustavu Bosne i Hercegovine, in Citanka ljudskih prava, ed. Jasna Baksic-Muftic, and Ljiljana Mijovic (Sarajevo: Centar za ljudska prava Univerziteta, 2001), 297. 13. Enver Imamovic, Porijeklo i pripadnost stanovnistva Bosne i Hercegovine (Sarajevo: Art 7, 1998), 114. 14. Kasim Trnka, Konstitutivnost naroda (Sarajevo: VKBI, 2000), 49 50. 15. Florian Bieber, Towards Better Governance with More Complexity? in Dayton and Beyond: Perspectives on the Future of Bosnia and Herzegovina, ed. Christophe Solioz and Tobias K. Vogel (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2004), 84, 78, 87. 16. Trnka, Konstitutivnost naroda, 19. 17. Omer Ibrahimagic, Srpsko osporavanje Bosne i Bosnjaka (Sarajevo: VKBI, 2001), 190. 18. Trnka, Konstitutivnost naroda, 30. 19. The Resolution s Preamble says: For the first time in the history of Bosnia and Herzegovina the representatives of Serb, Muslim, and Croat peoples have gathered, bonded by strong brotherhood in uprising, with the goal to bring political decisions that will open a path for our peoples to constitute their country pursuant to their will and their interests based on the results of armed struggle of the peoples of Yugoslavia and the peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 20. The Constitution of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1990. 21. Trnka, Konstitutivnost naroda, 57. 22. Ibid. Note how Trnka speaks about rights (plural) in this paragraph. In the previously quoted paragraph, he referred to this right or the collective national right very imprecise for a legal theorist. This terminological slipperiness shows just how vague, counterproductive, and useless this entire notion is. Or perhaps the vaguer the better for ethnopolitical manipulation. 23. Sarcevic, Ustavi i politika, 40. 24. Amy Gutmann, Identity in Democracy (Princeton & Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2003), 54. 25. Fareed Zakaria, The Future of Freedom (New York: Norton, 2003), 114. 26. Friedland s original definition is: Religious nationalism offers a particular ontology of power, an ontology revealed and affirmed through its politicized practices and the central object of its political concern, practices that locate collective solidarity in religious faith shared by embodied families, not in contract and consent enacted by abstract individual citizens. Religious Nationalism and the Problem of Collective Representation, Annual Review of Sociology 27 (2001): 125 52. 27. Thomas H. Eriksen, Ethnicity and Nationalism: Anthropological Perspectives (London & Boulder, CO: Pluto, 1993), 158. 28. Ibid., 12. 29. Ibid., 68. 30. Talcott Parsons, The Social System (New York: Free Press, 1964), 7. C 2007 The Author. Journal compilation C 2007 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

We, the Citizens of Ethnopolis: Asim Mujkic 127 31. Ethnic: designating or of a population subgroup having a common cultural heritage, as distinguished by customs, characteristics, language, common history, etc. Third College Edition of Webster s New World Dictionary of American English. 32. Etienne Balibar, We, the People of Europe? (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), 8. 33. Ibid. 34. For example, Article 5 of the Dayton Agreement provides that The Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina shall consist of three Members: one Bosniac, one Croat, each directly elected from the territory of the Federation, and one Serb directly elected from the territory of the Republika Srpska. This provision is extremely discriminatory. In particular, it is anti-Semitic, in that it prevents a Jewish citizen of Bosnia from becoming president. 35. David Peritz, Toward a Deliberative and Democratic Response to Multicultural Politics: Post-Rawlsian Reflections on Benhabib s The Claims of Culture, Constellations 11, no. 2 (2004): 270 71. 36. John Dewey, Democracy and Education in theWorld of Today, The Late Works, vol. 13: 303. 37. Gutmann, Identity in Democracy, 58. 38. Ibid., 77. 39. Ibid., 79. 40. Benhabib, On Culture, Public Reason, and Deliberation, 295. 41. Miodrag Zivanovic in Sanita Sehercehajic, U BiH Ne zivimo kao ljudi, nego kao Srbi, Hrvati i Bosnjaci, Oslobodjenje (Sarajevo), May 22, 2005, 6 7. 42. J¨urgen Habermas offers an explanation: Nation refers like gens and populus but unlike civitas, to peoples and tribes who were not yet organized in political associations . . . nations are communities of people of the same descent, who are integrated geographically, in the form of settlements or neighborhoods, and culturally by their common language, customs and traditions, but who are not yet politically integrated through the organizational form of the state (Between Facts and Norms, 494). In Bosnia and Herzegovina, however, nations are communities of common religious descent which historically originate in the Ottoman millet-system. Since 1878, after the Austro-Hungarian Empire occupied the Ottoman provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the process of ethnicization or nationalization influenced by European Romanticism and nationalism was initiated and to some extent has continued to the present. National membership in Bosnia and Herzegovina is usually determined by person s religious affiliation. Imamovic, Porijeklo i pripadnost stanovnistva Bosne i Hercegovine, 112. 43. Gutmann, Identity in Democracy, 57. 44. Papic, Novi Dayton nikome ne treba, 34. 45. Both theism and atheism receive completely different meanings in Ethnopolis. They become loyalty markers : membership in a particular ethnic community and membership in an appropriate religious community that is the differentia specifica of that particular community are practically interchangeable. 46. In 2003, a group of social democratic politicians, journalists, and intellectuals were unsuccessfully prosecuted for an attempted coup d ´etat. Top ethnopoliticians and the media they controlled orchestrated these unbelievable Stalinesque accusations. 47. Benhabib defines the concept of persons as self-interpreting and self-defining beings whose actions and deeds are constituted through culturally informed narratives. See Peritz, Toward a Deliberative and Democratic Response to Multicultural Politics, 276. 48. John Dewey, The Public and its Problems (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1954), 48. 49. Resid Hafizovic, Domestifikacija Nicejskog sindroma svadbenog veza Drzave i Crkve in Zenicke sveske No.1 Zenica: juli 2005: 147 151; 50. 50. Mile Babic, Krivotvorenje autenticne vjere, Zenicke Sveske 1 (July 2005): 172. 51. These parties are the SDA (Party of Democratic Action Bosniacs), the SDS (Serb Democratic Party), and the HDZ (Croat Democratic Union). The (non-ethnic) Social Democrats managed to win in the 2000 general elections mainly in those areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina where

Constellations Volume 14, Number 1, 2007 Bosniacs are in the majority. The ethnopolitical constellation of the entire country was the main cause of their failue in the elections two years later. 52. Senad Avdic, Veselje u drzavi: Rahat smo od pameti , Slobodna Bosna (Sarajevo), Jan. 20, 2005, 4 5. 53. Elmir Sadikovic, Slavo Kukic, Balkanska krcma-novi krug nacionalista, Oslobodjenje (Sarajevo), May 19, 2005, 30. 54. Vlaisavljevic, Politika znanja i neznanja, Odjek 2 (1998): 22. 55. Article II, paragraph 4: The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms provided for in this Article or in the international agreements listed in Annex I to this Constitution shall be secured to all persons in Bosnia and Herzegovina without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, color, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status. 56. Amer Obradovic, Jedna dusa a nas troje, Dani (Sarajevo), Sept. 2, 2005, 30. 57. Currently there are twelve Ministries of Education in Bosnia and Herzegovina: one per canton, one in the Republika Srpska, and one in Brcko district. There is no national ministry. 58. Ivan Lovrenovic, Dogovor skole razdvaja, Dani (Sarajevo), Sept. 23, 2005, 19. 59. According to the latest OSCE survey, more than 20% of the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina are illiterate. Ibid., 20. 60. Nerzuk Curak, Interview, Start (Sarajevo), Oct. 18, 2005, 66. 61. Every leftist opinion is denounced by the dominant ethnopolitical discourse as Communist, Neo-communist, Bolshevik, atheist, Yugo-nostalgic, Western etc. 62. Slavo Kukic, Interview, Dani (Sarajevo), April 9, 2005, 15. 63. Friedland, Religious Nationalism and the Problem of Collective Representation, 130. Asim Mujkic is Assistant Professor of Ethics at the Faculty of Political Sciences of the University of Sarajevo.